Dethroning the Dollar?

Optimal Multi-Asset Market Making

Katya Malinova · McMaster University
Andreas Park · University of Toronto

2026 INFORMS Conference on Financial Engineering and Fintech
November 6–7, 2026 · Stevens Institute of Technology · Hoboken

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Manhattan from Castle Point · Hoboken

Why does it matter?
A firm in Mexico pays a supplier in Thailand

MXN

USD

THB

spread + fee

spread + fee

today: routing through the vehicle; two legs, two spreads, two fees

what they want: direct conversion

This paper

One pool, many assets: how to design it, and when does it beat routing?

Design: the asset mix and trading fees that minimize total trading costs

Trading demand is given; fees cover LPs’ expected losses.

A necessary and sufficient condition for beating routing

Two things matter: return correlation and cross-pair volume.

Fee schedules that deter entry by a dollar-pair competitor

We characterize when a cost-minimizing fee schedule can deter such entry.

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Not only currencies: any assets traded against cash, e.g. tokenized stocks.

What an AMM is

A pool of reserves + a pricing rule \(R_0\cdot R_1=k\). Three things to know:

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)

① Price = slope
S = R₀ / R₁

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)

② Trade walks the curve
price moves → impact

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)

③ LPs shift it out
more depth, same price

Arbitrageurs pick off the pool whenever fundamentals move

buy & hold

AMM LP: concave relative to buy & hold

exchange rate change

holding value one currency rel. to other

"Impermanent loss" = adverse selection

Proposition: Adverse selection, priced from returns + volume alone.

Our closed form (Learning from DeFi):

\(\mathbb{E}[\text{IL}] = \dfrac{\sigma^2}{8}\)

The AMM fee must cover it.

FX trading: three structures

Dollar routing USD MXN THBThree bilateral pools USD MXN THBOne multi-asset pool USD MXN THB
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Capital multiplexing — the key intuition

Same total capital \(D\): split it across three pools, or pool it.

Three separate pools USDMXN⅓ D USDTHB⅓ D MXNTHB⅓ D

pool the capital →

One multi-asset pool USDw₀MXNw₁THBw₂D

each reserve backs both of its pairs

Pool rule: \(a_0^{w_0}\cdot a_1^{w_1}\cdot a_2^{w_2}=\) constant. Weights \(w_i\) = shares of the pool’s value.

each pool: 50–50 weights, capital ⅓ \(D\)

price impact \(\;\dfrac{2\Delta}{\tfrac13 D}=\dfrac{6\Delta}{D}\)

\(\Delta\) = trade size

weights ⅓ each, capital \(D\)

price impact \(\;\dfrac{3\Delta}{D}\)

Relative-price risk determines the loss

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\[\begin{aligned}\text{Two assets:}\quad&\mathbb E[\text{LP loss}]\simeq\tfrac12\,w_0w_1\,\sigma^{2}\,D\\[10pt]\text{Many assets:}\quad&\mathbb E[\text{LP loss}]\simeq\tfrac12\,\Phi(w)\,D,\qquad \Phi(w)=\sum_{i<j}w_iw_j\,\sigma_{ij}^{2}\end{aligned}\]

\(\sigma_{ij}\) = volatility of the \(i\)–\(j\) exchange rate. The sum includes dollar pairs.

  • Higher correlation \(\rho_{ij}\) of dollar returns → lower cross-rate volatility \(\sigma_{ij}\), at given individual volatilities.
  • → lower expected LP losses per dollar of capital, at given weights.

 For given weights: minimizing the total trading cost 

LPs break even: fees collected \(F\) = LP losses \(\tfrac12\Phi D\) → depth \(D=2F/\Phi\).

Traders pay fees plus price impact:

\[C(F)=\underbrace{F}_{\text{fees}}+\underbrace{\frac{\Gamma\,\Delta}{D}}_{\text{price impact}}=F+\frac{\Delta\,\Phi\,\Gamma}{2F}\]

\(\displaystyle F=\sum_{i<j}f_{ij}v_{ij},\qquad \Gamma(w)=\sum_{i<j}v_{ij}\Big(\frac{1}{2w_i}+\frac{1}{2w_j}\Big)\)

\(f_{ij}\) = fee rate, \(v_{ij}\) = volume traded on pair \(i,j\)

Result: fee schedules that collect the same total give the same depth and the same total trading cost.

At the optimal \(F\): fees = price impact, and \(C^*(w)=\sqrt{2\Delta\,\Phi(w)\,\Gamma(w)}\).

Next task: find the cost-minimizing capital weights

\(\displaystyle C^*=\min_w C^*(w)=\min_w\sqrt{2\Delta\,\Phi(w)\Gamma(w)}\)

\(\varepsilon_i\): currency \(i\)’s dollar return; \(\varepsilon_0=0\) for the dollar.

\(w_j\): capital weight of currency \(j\). The pool portfolio’s return is \(\displaystyle\sum_j w_j\varepsilon_j\).

Currency relative to the pool

\(\displaystyle \sigma_{iw}=\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}\!\left(\varepsilon_i-\sum_j w_j\varepsilon_j\right)}\)

We can express the minimum trading cost using trade size \(\Delta\), currency volumes, and these pool-relative volatilities.

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Optimal capital weights and trading costs

\(V_i\): total volume involving currency \(i\), including cross-pair volume.

\(\sigma_{iw}\): currency \(i\)’s volatility relative to the pool portfolio.   \(\Delta\): representative trade size.

Theorem. Optimal capital weights minimize the volume-weighted sum of relative-return volatilities:

\[C^*=\min_w\sum_{i=0}^{N}\sqrt{\Delta V_i}\,\sigma_{iw}\]

For a minimizing vector \(w^*\) of capital weights, optimal deposits ($) are

\[p_i a_i^*=\frac{\sqrt{\Delta V_i}}{\sigma_{iw^*}}\]

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  • For three currencies, we can express the weights in closed form

When does pooling beat vehicle routing?

Theorem: a multi-asset pool can be designed to achieve lower total trading costs than dollar routing if and only if \(T \gt 0\).

\[T=\underbrace{\sum_{i\lt j}\sqrt{V_iV_j}\,\rho_{ij}}_{\text{how currencies move together}}\;+\;\underbrace{\sum_{i\lt j}v_{ij}}_{\text{cross-pair volume}}\]

\(V_i\) = Total volume involving currency \(i\), including cross-pair volume.
\(\rho_{ij}\) = correlation of dollar returns · \(v_{ij}\) = direct cross-pair volume
Sums over non-dollar currencies.

  • This existence condition depends only on correlations and volumes.

Three currencies: correlation and cross-pair flow

With two non-dollar currencies, the theorem’s \(T\) becomes:

\[T=\sqrt{V_1V_2}\,(\rho+\beta),\qquad \beta=\frac{v_{12}}{\sqrt{V_1V_2}}\]

\(\rho\): correlation of dollar returns
\(\beta\): cross-pair volume relative to \(\sqrt{V_1V_2}\)

A pool can be designed to beat routing if and only if \(\rho\gt-\beta\).

More cross-pair volume increases the savings from direct trading. These savings can outweigh the extra LP compensation that negative correlation requires.

The value of choosing the weights

    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0     Both multi-asset designs and bilateral pools beat routing  Equal (BIS Mariana) and optimal weights (this paper) beat routing Only optimal weights (this paper) beat routingrouting winsρ · correlation of dollar returnsβ · cross-pair volume relative to √(V1V2) 

No cross-pair flow (\(\beta=0\)): equal weights need \(\rho>0.5\); optimal weights need only \(\rho>0\).

Symmetric case: same volume and volatility for both non-dollar currencies.

Where the BIS cross pairs sit

0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 EUR/SEK EUR/NOK EUR/CHF EUR/GBP EUR/AUD NZD/JPY ZAR/JPY EUR/CAD BRL/JPY EUR/JPY AUD/JPY EUR/CNY CAD/JPYrouting wins Equal and optimal weights beat routing Only optimal weights beat routing ρ · correlation of dollar returnsβ · cross-pair flow intensity

All 13 pairs clear \(\rho > -\beta\): an optimally weighted multi-asset pool beats dollar routing.

Dashed and solid lines: symmetric benchmark. Data: BIS Triennial Survey 2025; Refinitiv 2019–24. 

Deterring dollar-pair entry: general conditions

A dollar–peso entrant attracts only direct dollar–peso demand. To deter it:

1. Room on every dollar pair: the pool’s price impact alone does not exceed the entrant’s best total cost. The gap caps that pair’s fee.

2. Enough fee revenue: within these limits, the pool can raise the fees needed to compensate LPs at the cost-minimizing depth.

Dollar-pair fees are capped by their respective gaps. Each cross-pair fee is capped by the sum of its two dollar-pair fees, because traders can route inside the pool.

 

Result: a cost-minimizing fee schedule that deters dollar-pair entry exists if and only if conditions 1 and 2 hold. In general, \(T>0\) guarantees neither.

Cross-pair savings (select) without raising dollar-pair costs

Fee allocation maximizes cross-pair savings while neither dollar pair pays more than under routing.

Cross pair Cross-pair cost reduction Aggregate cost reduction
EUR/CHF 75% 10.0%
AUD/JPY 42% 1.8%
CAD/JPY 32% 0.3%

Aggregate costs include cross-pair trading and direct trading on both dollar pairs.

Take home: when multi-asset pools are superior

  • Shared deposits can support direct trading without fragmenting liquidity across bilateral markets.
  • An expression based on primitives (volatility and volume) determines
    • lowest possible trading costs
    • feasibility of a pool to beat vehicle routing
  • The pooling condition uses correlations and cross-pair volumes: positive correlation is good, sufficient cross-pair volume can offset negative correlation risk
  • Fee allocation can be used to defend the pool against dedicated dollar-market entry \(\to\) ex ante condition available
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Dethroning the Dollar? INFORMS Nov 2026

By Katya Malinova

Dethroning the Dollar? INFORMS Nov 2026

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